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IN THE SUPRE~1E COURT OF 'CHE 
STATE OF UTAH 





BRENT JAY SESSIONS, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant was charged with Burglary, a felony 
of the third degree. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant waived his right to a jury trial and 
was found guilty by the Honorable G. Hal Taylor, District 
Judge. Appellant was sentenced to a term of not more than 
five years in the Utah State Prison. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks an order of this Court affirming 
the judgment and sentence rendered below. 
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STA~EMENT OF FACTS 
Appelli1nt wa:~ L.i:icc1 jointly with his roorn , 1 te, 
Louis n. Dc::ihbs. 
Durin<J the ni9ht of September 15, 1977, 2 :;ervice 
station was broken into, and a television, sixty to '"ight/ 
pounds of frozen meat, ctnd some safety inspection st:i ck cc; 
were s•-, •n from the p iniscs (R.67-70). On Scptc•rnbcL· 22, 
1977, lh.:puty Sheriff !-IL_ice Hunks executed a search \/arrant 
at the a trc·,:nt where the appellants Sessions and Dabbs 
lived (~.73-74). Deputy Hanks found a television, a guC1ntity 
1lf frozen meat, and some safety inspection stickers during 
his search (R.74). All of these objects were identified 
as the ones stolen from the service station (R.68-70). The 
apartm nt is located approximately two city blocks frorn the 
service station (R.74). During the search, Deputy Hunks 
as~:ed who the television belonged to (R. 77). The app;_·llant 
Scss_i_o11s replied that it belonged to a friend; the co-defendan 
Dabbs did not reply. Id Later in the search, Deputy Hanks 
asked about the stickers. Id. The appellant Sessions said 
nothing, but the co-defendnnt Dabbs answered that he was 
an investor. Id. 
At the time of trial, appellant filed three motions. 
'L'he firsL. was a motion +:o sever based on the c;rounc1 that 
co-defendilnt Dabbs' st0tcment ("I am an investor'') w~s 
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adn1is ~ble at trial and would prejudicially incrimin<lte 
Sessions (R.22). This motion was denied (R.49). The 
second motion asked that all evidence gained by Deputy 
Hank'.'' search be suppressed on the grounds that the 
affi, :vi t upon which the warrant j ssued was defective 
(R.21). The appellitnt did not produce the warrant or 
the , :'idavit in support of his motion, nor did he make 
a mo 1.ion to cliscover that evidence (R. 56-57). The 
court below held that the appellant had the burden of 
going forward on the motion to suppress, and that in the 
absence of any evidence the motion would be denied (R.50, 
56,57). The court below then denied the motion to 
suppress with neither the warrant nor the affidavit 
before it (R.56-57). The third motion asked that the 
identity of a confidential informant be disclosed (R.23). 
Deputy Hanks represented to the court below that the disclo-
sure of the informant's identity would jeopardize the 
inf0rmant's safety and decrease his usefulness as an 
informant (R.62). The court below held that disclosure 
of the informant's identity would not aid the defense and 
denied the motion (R.62-63). The informant did not testify 
at tri~l. The court found both defendants guilty (R.24). 
The defendant Dabbs was placed on probation (R.41), and 
defendant Sessions ~as sentenced to serve a term of not 
3 
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less th<111 five yei.Jrs in the Utuh State Prison, this 
sentc>nce to run conccirrenU~' with the other sentence 
de£endunt Sessions Wi 1 :; servi.119 (R.34). 
It is from this cr·.nviction and sentence that 
the defendant Sessions appeals. 
ARGUMELJT 
POHlT I 
THE COURT BF.LOW D:tD NOT ERR IN DENYING THE 
r :yr ION TO SEVER. 
Two or more defendants may be charged in the 
same information if it is alleged that they participated 
in t!ie same act that constitutes an offense. Utah Coc1e 
Ann. § 77-21-31 (2) (Supp. 1977). Appellant claims, 
however, that it was error to try him with his roommate 
Dabbs because Dabbs' statement (i.e., "I am an investor") 
would incriminate thc1 appellant and deny the appellant 
his right to cross-examine Dabbs. Respondent insists 
that this claim of error is without merit for three 
reasons. First, Dabbs' statement does not incriminute 
the appell3nt, and its admissio~ at trial could not 
have prejudiced th:' appellant. Second, appellant was 
tried without a jury, and the c0urt below is presumed 
to know the law (i.e., that Dabbs' hearsay statement wus 
only admissible against Dabbs) and to have ucted in 
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accocdancc with the law. Third, the statement was not a 
confes~ion,~1d is not within the rule of law established 
by the authorities cited by the app,·lla.nt. 
As to the first point, respondent contends that 
Dabbs' s~atement, "I am an investor," does not refer to the 
app~llant Ses~ions and cannot be reasonably construed to 
incriminate h~n. Appellant ar0ues that the statement, 
" • i:.--: incriminLitory in that it shows a knowledge on th£_ 
part _of_Dabb_c; of where he got the stickers." (Brief of 
Appellant, p. 3, emphasis added.) Assu~ing that is true, 
it still does not incriminate Session, the appellant in 
this case, because being an "investor" has no relationship 
to being in possession of a television, sixty pounds of 
frozen meat, and numerous state safety inspection stickers. 
Respondent must conclude that appellant has not shown that 
admission of Dabbs' statement was prejudicial to him. 
Further, respondent avers that any possible 
prejudice was removed because the case was heard by the 
court without a jury. In State v. McLaughlin, 22 Utah 2d 321, 
452 P.2d 875 (1969), a defendant claimed error because a 
statement made by a co-defendant was admitted in evidence. 
This Court stated: 
-5-
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"Some of the more recent 
cases indicate thut a jury, 
Gven \'Ii th proriC'r instructions by 
t!Je court, woulc1 likely fail to 
consider an ad1 'ission or conf Pssj on 
only a9ainst l:J'~ cL::clarant. In 
thG in:;tant case, 1ve conclude that 
a trL 1_ judcy· of learning 0nd 
exper: :,nee wouJ_d only consider 
i.:'1e e·, ;_rlr.:crtC2 as ii~ rcl_atecl to the 
issd•; ,~;- th;c guilt 0( innocence 
of i1c1, ·:;-hlin." (Fo·:tnotcs omitted.) 
~I._cLC',1;. - '~n_ at 373, 452 P.2c1 at 876. 
Respondent submits tl1at the court below kne1v that Dab')s' 
statement was not aclmissible against the appellant, and 
did not consider it in finding the appellant guilty. 
Finally, respondent contends that the consti-
tutional re~uirement for separate trials of co-defendants 
only applies in cases of confessions and not in every case 
of an incriminatory statement. The rationale of Bruton v. 
United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968), was that, although a 
j~ry can follow many cautionary instructions, • there 
are some contexts in which the risk that the jury will ~ot, 
or cannot, follow instructions is so great, and the conse-
quences of fai1ure so vital to the defendant, that the 
practical and human limitations of the jury system cnnnot 
be ignored." Bruton at 135. Bruton suggests that a 
confession of a co-defendant can be such inf lamwat.ory 
evidence that cautionary instructions rnily not reliE've the 
-6-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
defendant of prcju{ice. Respondent doubts, however, that 
eveiy statc;ment of a co-def(•ndant is this influ.mmatory. 
I\ppellant's atte;npt to expand the Bruton rule beyond 
confessions is not persuasive. Justice Stewart's concurring 
opinion in Bruton at 137 ~tatc~ that it is improper to rely 
on cautionary inst>uctio.1s when 11 •• the highly damaging 
0~1'::-of-court statPrnent of a cocl_nfendant" is placed in 
evidence. Dabbs' statement, even if considered prejudicial 
to the appellant, c~nnot be categorized as a highly dam~ging, 
inflammu.tory piece of evidence that cannot be objectively 
weighed. Respondent submits that the admission of Dabbs' 
statement was not prejudicial error. 
POINT II 
THE COURT BELOW DID NOT ERR IN DENYING APPELLANT'S 
MOTION TO DISCLOSE THE IDENTITY OF A CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT. 
The State has a privilege to refuse to disclose 
the identity of an informer unless the trial court finds that 
his identity has already been disclosed or disclosure is 
essential to assure a fair determination of the issues. Utah 
Rules of Evidence, Rule 36. The defendant has the burden of 
demonstrating that the informant would be a material witness 
on the issue of guilt. State v. Bankhead, 30 Utah 2d 135, 
139, 514 P.2c1 800, 803 (1973). Further, a defendant may 
not compel disclosure of an informant's identity to contest 
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Irl. at 118, 511} P.2(1 f-: 802. r:esponclr:nt avers that 
appcll<:lnL has not carried his burden of showing th.11: the 
inforr, •nt was a material witness. There is no cvidcrr·c 
in thL record that would Link the infc :-;nant to the 
commis--.:_o!l o" Li:c cri1w0 • l\ppcllai•t a •,ucs Lhut Dabli ' 
s 1-a tern· 't rnigh t i1i1ply thu t Dabbs bought tli~ stickers, 
and tlJ,'1.t if the informer wa0 the seller of tlw stickecs, 
his testimony would b2 material. (Brief of Appellant, 
pp.5-6.) The error in this argument is that there is 
no evidence that the informant was the seller, and 
respond< it submits that speculation drawn from an infl·rence 
cannot rcJlace the evidence appellant must produce to carry 
his burden of demonstrating materiality. 
The cases cited by appellant are factually 
distinguishable from the present case. In Rovario v. United 
States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957); Port0_'_"''.'~~~- Uni!_ed 5._!:ates, 
221 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1955); United States v. Conforti, 200 
F.2d 365 (7th Cir. 1952); and Sorrentino v. United St2tes, 
163 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1947); each defendant was charged 
with the sale of a narcotic drug to an unnamed inform2r, 
and each defendant sought disclosure of the alleged buyer's 
identity. In the case of a narcotic sale to an unnarn(~cl 
-8-
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buyc·1·, di.sc 1 CJ ire of the: inform21nt' s identity would be 
cssc_,ntial to tc: e defense. In this case, however, there 
is no ovicknce tli.ct thr' informar:t p'Orticipated in the 
offense, and his 
'StiI"':lny has not b~,en shown to be 
r:atc>r: ·11 to the is· uc of guilt. Respondent urges the 
Co ur ;_- tu f inc1 thd t thr• tr ici 1 court proper J y denied 
appellant's disclosure request. 
POIN'r III 
THE COUHT BELOW PROPERLY DENIED APPELL.7\NT' S 
JliOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE I3ECAUS!: APPELLANT FAILED 
TO CARRY HIS BURDEil OF GOING FOR\F1HD ON THE MOTION. 
Appellant attempted to suppress evidence 
obtained during a search under a warrant. Searches 
conducted pursuant to a warrant are presumptively 
valid, and the movant has the burden of showing that 
the search was illegal. State v. Ame:>_, 222 Kan. 88, 
563 P.2d 1034 (1977); State v. Willcutt, 19 Or.App. 
93, 526 P.2d 607 (1974); United States v. Various 
Ga_~linq De\~ice:'_, 478 F.2d 1194 (5th Cir. 1973). 
SpecificMlly, the defendant has the burden of 
dcmonst1ating that an affidavit on which a search 
warrant issues is invalid under SpineJli_v. United 
StutE's, 393 U.S. 410 (1969), and Aguilar v. Texas, 
-9-
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:no Ti.s. 103 (1%1). :"._:r~,_,, ~11:)1_:_'_:_ al 92, 563 P.2c1 at 1039-40; 
'l'>. is Cou·ct has helcl that a 
def,~11 !ant bears thc> l·•1cde11 of persuasion in moving l•' suppres~ 
cvidc,ncc; where the dcfcnc!ant's stancling is in issue. 
93' (19GG). In thi· Cc1sc, app...:llar,·c. produced no c·Jicl·nce as 
to the content of t11:-~ ciffirlcwit in SUIJ[l'::Jrt of his mo::ion to 
suppress. The presumption of constitutionality was not 
overcornP, and respondent submits that the trial court 
pro?erly denied U1e motion to suppress. 
POINT IV 
THE COUR1' BELOW PROPEHLY APPLIED TH:C PRE SUI; 'PION 
OF UTi\Ii CODE Mm. § 76-6-402 (SUPP. 1977), IN THIS Ci\ "'' 
The Utah criminal code provides that posse~. con of 
recently stolen property is prima facie evidence that the 
possessor stole the property, unless a satisfactory e .0lana-
tion is rnac'!c'. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-402(1) (Supp. 1977). 
In State v:..~Con,;.:.C\le:;_, 30 Utah 2c1 302, 517 P.2d 547 (1'J73), 
•1is Court held that the same inferences can be dra1•m from 
the posscssi0n of recently stolen property in a burgl~ry 
CilSe as in ci larceny case. Respondent do'.<.; not undeJ: ,- c~and 
appellant's fourth point on a.ppeal to dispute the 0cmz'1_1Ps 
holding. The suffici_c'ncz of the evidence, i;'cluc1inci tlle 
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eviclcJJcc• of po :'.;ession of the stole · govJs, will be discussed 
in Point V, inFra. This point will be limited to a discussion 
of the .CJ.£J,llical_)ilJ:_ty of the presumption to this case. 
First, appellant was founcl in possession of ~oo~s 
that weer· 1-os·i_tively identified as stolen (R.68-70, 74). 
Second, appellant ·_1ffen:d no explanation of his possession 
of any of the stolen goods except the television. His 
explanation of possession of the television was that it 
belonged to a friend. The owner of the television did not 
kno~ the appellant, nor did he give appellant permission to 
use it (R.67-68). The appellant's explanation is, therefore, 
not satisfactory. Finally, the goods in appellant's 
possession were stolen recently. The burglary occurred 
between late September 15, 1977, and 7:00 a.m. September 16, 
1977, and the search was conJucted in the afternoon of 
September 22, 1977. The question of what is such a recent 
possession as to raise the presumption is a question of fact, 
and a possession as long as four months from the date of the 
theft can present a jury question. State v. Bowen, 45 Utah 
110, 143 Pac. 134 (1914). A 39 day period between a burglary 
and the discovery of stolen goo~s is not too great a period 
for evidence of possession of the goods to support a burglary 
convictio1 State v. Ledbetter, 17 Utah 2d 353, 412 P.2d 312, 
-11-
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cert-.. der1i 1 385 U.S. 922 (l9i,0). Res_:onc1cnt submiLs that 
t\1(' six t_o seven day period hct\,1een the burglary ctnc1 the 
search Llised a question of fact, properly resolved below, 
of whetlu'r apf_)ellant Wil~> in possession of "recently" 
stolen 9oods. 
f\.,'"spondcn I:. ,-cubmi to; tho I:. the prc:ou~1ption tho t the 
posses3or of recently stolen goods stole the goods was 
properly applied in this burglary case. 
POINT V 
THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE VERDICT 
OF THE COUR'l' BELO\'/. 
Appellant's brief alludes to facts brought out 
at preliminary hearing, such as the allegation that the 
appellant had just moved into Dabbs' apartment (Brief of 
Appellant, p. 11). The record does not contain the transcript 
of the prc~lirninarv hearing, nor does it contain any other 
evidence to support appellant's contention that he recently 
moved into Dabbs' apartment. Respondent submits that 
appellant's factual allegation is improperly before the 
Court. 
The evidence in the record and the inferences 
fairly dr0wn therefrom, viewed in the light most favorable 
to the verdict are as follows: 
-12-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
A burglary was cornIT.itted at Cone's service 
station. The ar~ellant was found, seven days later and 
two city blocks away, in possession of goods taken during 
the burglary. Appellant offered no explanation as to his 
possession of the stolen meat or stickers, and stated that 
th~ television belonged to an unnamed friend. In fact, 
the mmer of the television did not know the appellant or 
give him permission to u~~ it. The appellant's explanation 
of his possession of the television was either false or 
unsutisfactory. 
As the Court stated in State v. Thomas, 121 
Utah 639, 641, 244 P.2d 653, 654 (1952): 
• • possession of articles 
recently stolen, when coupled with 
circumstances inconsistent with 
innocence, such as •.•. making a 
false or improbable or unsatisfactory 
explanation of the possession, may be 
sufficient to connect the possessor 
with the offense of burglary and 
justify his conviction of it." 
Respondent submits the evidence was sufficient to support 
the verdict. 
CONCLUSION 
Bas 0 d on the foregoing points and authorities, 
respondent asks that the judgment of the court below be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
CRAIG L. BARLOW 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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